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MENDING THE HOLD IN FLORIDA:
GETTING A BETTER GRIP ON AN
OLD INSURANCE DOCTRINE
Michael Vincent Laurato, Sr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The "Mend the Hold" doctrine, created by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1877,1 is a legal device used to prevent an insurance
company from raising any reason not contained in the pre-suit claim
denial letter as a defense in litigation.2 With rare exception, made only
for the seasoned first-party insurance practitioner, the nearly univer-
sal reaction to the phrase, "mend the hold," is confusion. 3 Considering
that only a handful of Florida cases 4 have mentioned the "Mend the
* Michael Vincent Laurato, Sr. is a partner and shareholder in the law firm of Austin
& Laurato, P.A. Mr. Laurato practices in the area of first-party insurance coverage litiga-
tion. B.A., Tulane University, 1994, J.D., The National Law Center at George Washington
University, 1997. Gratitude is extended to Ms. Faith Gorsky and Mr. David Bullock for
their assistance with research for this article. Ms. Gorsky is a second year law student at
Stetson University School of Law and a law clerk at Austin & Laurato, P.A. Mr. Bullock is a
second year law student at Stetson University School of Law and a law clerk at Austin &
Laurato. Gratitude is also extended to Mr. Matthew Reeder for his assistance as well. Mr.
Reeder is a third year law student at Stetson University College of Law and a law clerk for
Austin & Laurato. Any errors, omissions, misinterpretations, or oversights are solely the
responsibility of the author.
1. See Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 268 (1877) (while the United States
Supreme Court cited other cases on the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, the McCarthy Court is
widely cited as the opinion which "created" the "Mend the Hold" doctrine in common law).
2. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990).
3. The "Mend the Hold" doctrine has often been confused with the legal doctrines of
judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, "fraud on the court," and collateral estoppel, among
other legal theories. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing
Inconsistencies in Litigation With a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The
Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel,
"Mend the Hold," "Fraud on the Court," and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CoNN.
INS. L.J. 589 (1997-98) (commenting that, at times, courts do not clearly identify what
doctrine is being relied upon, rather it seems the courts applying the above doctrines under
factual scenarios that "just [aren't] right"); Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) (describing judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, "fraud on the court," collateral
estoppel, and "mend the hold" as cousins).
4. See John A. DeVault, III, "Mend the Hold" An Antiquated Doctrine of Fairness, 70
FLA. B.J. 8 (1996) (noting no Florida decision citing the "mend the hold" doctrine was found
after a Westlaw search; however, a recent Westlaw search reveals 5 Florida decisions which
specifically mention the "Mend the Hold" doctrine).
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Hold" doctrine, 5 it is common for Florida lawyers and judges to be un-
familiar with the doctrine when it is raised in court. 6
Part of the legal puzzlement may be explained by the fact that
the phrase, "mend the hold," is not a legal term at all, but a legal adap-
tation of an 19th century wrestling term, meaning to get a better grip,
or hold, on your opponent. 7 Over its long, but somewhat quiet history,8
the "Mend the Hold" doctrine has been described as a "quirky," but
"persisten[t]" doctrine, "especially applicable to insurance companies
that change their reason for refusing to pay a claim . . . ."9 In the
"quirky" words of the 1877 United States Supreme Court, the majority
held as follows:
Where a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching
anything involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has
begun, change his ground, and put his conduct upon another and a
different consideration. He is not permitted thus to mend his hold.
He is estopped from doing it by a settled principle of law.10
Despite the 125 year relative hibernation of the "Mend the
Hold" doctrine, the doctrine has made a recent resurgence.'1 Along
with the related doctrines of estoppel and waiver, courts and commen-
tators have suggested that the re-birth of the "Mend the Hold"
doctrine, has been a reaction to litigants' and, especially insurers', 12
increasing tendency to take inconsistent litigation positions. As one
"mend the hold" commentator has aptly noted, courts have increas-
ingly expressed intolerance for insurers who adjust legal positions like
chameleons adjust their color.' 3
5. Robert H. Sitkoff, "Mend the Hold" and Erie: Why an Obscure Contracts Doctrine
Should Control in Federal Diversity Cases, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1059 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 362 (noting that an Illinois court called the
doctrine "amend his hold"); see DeVault, III, supra note 4 (stating that the author believed
the doctrine to be "mend the hole").
7. See Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 357.
8. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 692.
9. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 357.
10. See Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 258.
11. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 692.
12. Id. (One commentator has described the insurance industry as the largest, most
frequent private user of the civil justice system that, conservatively, spends a billon [sic]
dollars a year on coverage litigation producing tens of thousands of briefs filed against
policy holders in our nations [sic] courts to deny policy benefits to insureds. The
commentator references the insurance industry's briefs in these cases as examples of the
flagrant inconsistent litigation positions taken by insurers against insureds.).
13. Id.
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While there can be little question that in recent years there has
been increased "judicial perturbation" 14 to an insurer's "weather
vane"15 arguments that "shift with the wind,"16 there is equally little
question that most state courts have failed to provide a cogent, consis-
tent theory to preclude the shifting positions in the first-party
insurance context.1 7 To complicate matters, well-entrenched rules of
"notice"i8 pleadings and other procedures favoring the liberal amend-
ment of those pleadings, 19 clash, almost irreconcilably, with equitable
doctrines such as "Mend the Hold" that require every proverbial duck
to be in the proverbial row at the outset of the litigation. Historically,
Florida Courts have been no different.20
In the first-party insurance context, Florida courts have tradi-
tionally, relied on loose, general notions of waiver and estoppel to
prohibit insurers from raising certain matters in defensive pleadings
that were not initially raised in the claim denial letter even in the face
of procedural rules favoring liberality of pleading amendments. 2' In-
deed, rather than creating tension with the rationale of the "Mend the
Hold" doctrine, several of Florida's procedural rules of pleading, as well
as portions of the state insurance code, act as a quasi-"Mend the Hold"
doctrine and complement the judicial treatment by procedurally effect-
ing a waiver for matters not raised, 22 not raised timely,23 or improperly
raised.24 Those rules, however, do not go as far as the "Mend the Hold"
doctrine, for if the matter is timely and properly raised, the matter will





17. Id. at 591 (stating many times courts do not clearly identify why an inconsistent
position should be precluded; it seems to be a matter of "it just isn't right").
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring "notice" pleadings only state ultimate facts alleging a
recognized cause of action).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (governing amendments of pleadings). It is universally
recognized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for liberality of amendment of
pleadings.
20. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a), (d), (e), 1.140, 1.110 (pleading and amendment rules for
Florida are similar to the Federal rules).
21. See Southchase Parcel 45 Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Garcia, 844 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); See also MLB v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001).
22. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h) (stating any affirmative defenses not timely raised
are waived).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P 1.120(b) (requiring claims and defenses based on fraud be
pleaded specifically); See also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(c) (requiring defenses based on failure of
conditions precedent be pleaded with specificity).
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What is lacking, from Florida's "mend the hold" insurance juris-
prudence is a clear, uniform judicial theory to remedy insurers
engaging in a "gotcha"25 or "sporting"26 theory of justice against in-
sureds in coverage litigation. Historically, Florida Courts have applied
the "Mend the Hold" principles, masquerading behind theories of es-
toppel and waiver. 27
This article addresses the "Mend the Hold" doctrine in Florida.
Part I of the article generally discusses the judicial development of the
"Mend the Hold" doctrine. Part II of the article traces the "Mend the
Hold" doctrine in Florida as applied by the Florida Courts in insurance
matters, loosely disguised under traditional waiver and estoppel prin-
ciples. Part III of the article discusses the interplay between Florida
procedural and statutory provisions, common insurance policy provi-
sions, and the "Mend the Hold" doctrine. Finally, the article posits
that Florida Courts should formally adopt, through its common law or
by statutory codification, the "Mend the Hold" doctrine to promote judi-
cial economy and fundamental fairness in first-party insurance
matters.
II. MEND THE HOLD HISTORICALLY: WHAT IS IT?
A. Distinguished from Waiver and Estoppel
The "Mend the Hold" doctrine has common historical roots with
the doctrines of both equitable and judicial estoppel.28 Inasmuch, all
three doctrines aim to prevent a party from shifting litigation posi-
tions, they are properly said to be "cousins."29
While it is accurate to relate the "Mend the Hold" doctrine with
the other equitable doctrines, to equate the "Mend the Hold" doctrine
with those equitable doctrines would be inaccurate. Equitable estoppel
requires a detrimental reliance on an inconsistent prior position. 30
The more stringent theory of judicial estoppel is understood to prevent
a party from using conflicting theories to prevail in both a prior and
25. Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
26. See Anderson, supra note 3 at 692.
27. See Southchase Parcel 45 Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Garcia, 844 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also MLB v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001).
28. See Sitkoff, supra note 5.
29. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 357.
30. See Sitkoff, supra note 5 (explaining the requirement of reliance in equitable
estoppel is reflective of equitable estoppel's purpose).
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subsequent litigation. 31 The "Mend the Hold" doctrine requires neither
detrimental reliance, nor conflicting theories in subsequent litigation.
The "Mend the Hold" doctrine is succinctly summed up as limit-
ing a party's defenses to those based on the pre-litigation explanation
for the non-performance given to the other party.32 Simply put, the
"Mend the Hold" doctrine limits the available defenses to the exact de-
fense asserted at the time of breach.33 Historically, "Mend the Hold" is
a contract doctrine, applicable only to contract cases. 34 As the doctrine
has jurisprudentially matured, "Mend the Hold" has proved particu-
larly applicable to insurance matters. 35
B. McCarthy and Harbor Insurance: Inception to Modernity
A historical examination of the "Mend the Hold" doctrine is in-
complete without first discussing Railway Co. 36 and Harbor Ins. Co. 3 7
The 1877 Railway Co. case involved a relatively insignificant transpor-
tation and contract dispute over sixteen carloads of cattle.38 This is the
case where the Supreme Court created the "Mend the Hold" doctrine. 39
More than a century later, the "Mend the Hold" doctrine was once
again addressed by the Honorable Judge Richard Posner in the Harbor
Ins. Co. case that involved over a billion dollars in bank loans, the col-
lapse of an enormous international financial conglomerate, securities
fraud convictions, and an estimated $25 million dollars in insurance
coverage, divided between two insurers, one primary and one excess. 40
i. Railway Co. v. McCarthy
The Railway Co. decision is significant, primarily for its use of
the phrase, "mend the hold." After McCarthy's cattle arrived five
hours late in Baltimore, the railroad company refused to ship the cattle
that day as agreed.41 Initially, the railroad told McCarthy there were
31. Id. (explaining the purpose of judicial estoppel is to preserve the integrity of the
judicial system by disallowing inconsistent results).
32. Id. (explaining the traditional purpose of of the "mend the hold" doctrine is to allow
a contracting party to rely on the given explanation for the breach as the exclusive reason).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 357.
36. Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 258.
37. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 357.
38. Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 258.
39. Id.
40. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 359-60.
41. Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 258.
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insufficient cars to accommodate the cattle.42 McCarthy sued on the
"contract of affreightment" 43 and the railroad defended. 44 The railroad
sought to avail itself not of the pre-suit "want of cars"45 defense ini-
tially raised, but shifted to a litigation defense that prohibited the
shipment of goods on the Sabbath.46 The gist of the railroad's litiga-
tion defense hinged on the undisputed fact that a Sunday shipment of
McCarthy's cows would be illegal.47 For reasons unimportant here, the
"Sunday law of West Virginia" was applicable to the cattle shipment.48
In rejecting the railroad's shift in positions, the Court found it
fair to presume that the reason given at the time of the breach, i.e., the
insufficiency of the cars, was the real defense.49 The Court bluntly
noted the Sunday Law defense of illegality was an after-thought, sug-
gested by the pressure and exigencies of the case. 50 As a result, the
Court enunciated a settled principle of 1877 law creating a name for
the situation where a party is not permitted to give one reason pre-suit
and change his ground after litigation has begun.5 1 The settled princi-
ple of 1877 law name now had a name: the "Mend the Hold" doctrine.
ii. Harbor Insurance Company v. Continental Bank
For over a century, the "Mend the Hold" doctrine received rela-
tively miniscule implementation in case law, until 1990 when one of
America's most respected jurists, Judge Richard Posner, touched on
the doctrine in one of the largest insurance disputes of the era. In Har-
bor Ins. Co., Judge Posner, in what proved to be a very colorful
opinion, 52 chastised an insurer for "hoking up" a phony defense and for
trying inconsistent defenses on "for size."53
42. Id. at 265.
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining contract of affreightment as an
agreement for carriage of goods by water).
44. Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 258.
45. Id. at 265 (According to the defendant, there were not enough cars necessary to
transport the plaintiffs cattle.).
46. Id. at 265.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 267.
49. Id.
50. Railway Co., 96 U.S. at 267.
51. Id.
52. Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's
Cerebration of Insurance Law and Continuing Blind Spots of Econominalism, 7 CONN. INS.
L.J. 7, 15 (2001).
53. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an insured
bank, Continental, that bought a billion dollars in loans from a col-
lapsed bank, Penn Square Bank.54 Continental Bank was charged
with securities fraud and settled the charges by agreeing to pay $17.5
million.55 It had a valid insurance policy that delineated that Harbor
Insurance Company would reimburse the first $15 million and Allstate
Insurance Company would be reimbursing the next $10 million.56
Before the bank settled its securities fraud case, the insurers argued
that the behavior of the directors was so egregious that federal and
state law would forbid indemnity on the policies.5 7
However, when the bank sued on the policies, the insurers
"changed course, and stated that the bank settled ... the fraud case
prematurely and improvidently because the directors had not been
guilty of any misconduct at all."5 8 Despite the inconsistent positions of
the insurers, a jury agreed and found no liability on the policies. 59 In
rejecting the insurers "chang[e] of tune,"60 Judge Posner noted that the
"Mend the Hold" doctrine embodies the notion that a party is expected
to have "all his pins in perfect order when he files his first pleading."61
However, the court remained concerned that the "reach of the [mend
the hold] doctrine" was jurisprudentially uncertain, and that there
may be some circumstances where an insurer should be allowed to
amend its initial claim denial decision; the rules of procedure do coun-
tenance just such an amendment. 62 After discussing the interplay
between procedural rules allowing amendment of pleadings, the court
stated that the doctrine is "very damaging to insurance companies;"
nevertheless, it was required as a necessary "corollary" of the duty of
"good faith" imposed on parties to a contract. 63
The court struck the balance between modern rules of pleading
and contractual notions of good faith by adding a caveat to the "Mend
the Hold" doctrine. In the retrial, the jury was to be instructed that
the insurance companies were not allowed to change their initial de-




58. Id. at 360.
59. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 360.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 364.
62. Id. at 363.
63. Id.
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fense to liability unless the change was based on new information that
could not have been obtained at the time of the initial pleading.6 4
After Harbor Ins. Co., the "Mend the Hold" doctrine was, in a
sense, modernized to conform to modern rules of pleading. Under Har-
bor Ins. Co.'s conceptualization of the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, an
insurer has a "safe-harbor," of sorts, for newly discovered defenses
which could not have been discovered earlier. In the face of the Harbor
Ins. Co. holding, an insurer attempting to raise a defense not raised
initially in the claim denial letter has a two-pronged burden of proof:
first, that the information is "new"; second, that the "new" information
could not have been obtained earlier.65
III. MEND THE HOLD IN FLORIDA: DOES IT EXIST?
Much attention to this point has been spent on one 1877 United
States Supreme Court opinion and one opinion over 100 years later out
of the Seventh Federal Circuit. Florida, like other states, 66 has many
cases that recognize the "essentials" of the "Mend the Hold" doctrine in
insurance matters without specifically identifying the application as
the "Mend the Hold" doctrine.
In Florida, it can be properly said that the doctrine is incognito,
operating under multiple aliases. Florida's "Mend the Hold" doctrine
is disguised under doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Despite the juris-
prudential confusion between doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and mend
the hold, the answer to the question of whether the "Mend the Hold"
doctrine exists in Florida is, "Yes." As it has historically been the case,
the doctrine is especially applicable in Florida in first-party insurance
scenarios.
A. Florida Cases: Mend the Hold Essentials
For example, in the 1979 case of Salcedo, the Florida Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeals mentioned the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, but it
applied an estoppel theory to preclude a party from arguing inconsis-
tent positions regarding mediation provisions and the statute of
limitations in both a prior and subsequent action.67 This case is a good
64. Id. at 369.
65. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
66. See Sitkoff, supra note 5 (citing cases from several jurisdictions); see also Harbor
Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363 (citing cases from other jurisdictions).
67. Salcedo, 368 So. 2d at 1337.
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illustration of a Florida court's application of a doctrine akin to judicial
estoppel, under a "mend the hold" sobriquet. 68
Again, in Heimer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 69 Florida's Third District
Court of Appeals mentioned the "Mend the Hold" doctrine to correct
what it considered "Catch-22"70 litigation tactics but invoked nothing
resembling any traditional "mend the hold" jurisprudence. The
Heimer decision is a good example of the Florida court's application of
the "Mend the Hold" doctrine to correct a litigation strategy that the
court felt just wasn't right. The analysis applied in Heimer, masquer-
ading under the "mend the hold" misnomer, was essentially one of
equitable estoppel, where a party misleads another, to the other's det-
riment, in an attempt to "have his cake and eat it too."71
In yet other situations, Florida courts, especially in insurance
cases, have expressly applied the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to a
factual situation where "mend the hold" was more of a proposition. A
line of Florida cases that I have labeled the "Proof of Loss" cases are
illustrative.
For example, in Balough v. Jewelers' Mutual Ins. Co, 72 an in-
surer made a general denial of liability prior to litigation. The insured
was required under the policy to file proof of loss within a certain time
frame and failed to do so. 3 It was undisputed that the insured failed
to file a timely proof of loss, but the court nevertheless upheld the in-
sured's claim for benefits. 74 The court noted that the insurer's
"unconditional denial of liability" made filing of the proof of loss a "fu-
tile act" since coverage had already been denied.75 Rather than relying
on the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, which would have clearly precluded
the insurer from raising the proof of loss defense, the court stated that
the requirement for filing a proof of loss was waived76 under Florida
law.
68. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1118 (1989) (meaning a descriptive
name or epithet; nickname).
69. 400 So. 2d 771, 772-73 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
70. Heimer, 400 So. 2d at 773 citing Salcedo, 368 So. 2d at 1339 ("In earlier times, the
rule we apply in this case was said to reflect the feeling that a party may not 'mend his
hold,'... or 'blow hot and cold at the same time' or 'have his cake and eat it too!'. . . Today,
we might say that the courts will not allow the practice of the 'Catch-22' or 'gotcha!' school of
litigation to succeed.").
71. Id. at 773.
72. 167 F. Supp. 763, 768 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 774.
75. Id. at 773.
76. Id.
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Am. Ins. Co. of Newark v. Burson77 epitomizes the Florida
court's application of the modern "Mend the Hold" doctrine in an insur-
ance case, under the disguise of waiver. In that case, the Fifth Circuit,
applying Florida law, held that an insurer's general denial of liability
pre-suit, constituted a "waiver" of any failure by the plaintiff to
promptly notify the insurer of the loss. 78
However, in its rationale, the court identified the essential ele-
ments79 of Harbor Ins. Co.'s "Mend the Hold" doctrine:
[T]he testimony convinces us that [the insurer] had actual knowl-
edge of the loss within a reasonable time frame[] [Nievertheless, in
view of further testimony that the appellant denied liability for the
loss on the ground that is was 'an embezzlement instead of a
theft'[sic], we think the record fairly supports the trial court's con-
clusion that the general denial of liability by the [insurer]
constituted a waiver of any failure to promptly notify the [insurer]
of the loss.80
Thus, the Burson decision provides a good paradigm of a Florida court
applying waiver principles through a "mend the hold" analysis. The
Burson court relied on all the "mend the hold" essentials: the pre-suit
reason for claim denial, the change in litigation position, and the avail-
ability of the information to the insurer, measured by the court's
determination that the insurer had "actual knowledge." Similar, yet
not identical, "waiver/mend the hold" holdings were reached in a line of
Florida "proof of loss" cases.8'
77. 213 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1954).
78. Id. at 490.
79. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 362.
80. Burson, 213 F.2d at 490.
81. See Wegener v. Int'l Bankers Ins. Co., 494 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the insurer "waives" any right to argue compliance with conditions precedent
of recovery, such as proof of loss, when insurer argued that policy was cancelled); See also
Guarantee Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 57 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1952) (holding that insurer's
agent had authority to "waive" proof of loss when insured were informed that losses would
not be covered); See Keel v. Indep. Life and Accidental Ins. Co., 99 So.2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1957)
(holding that insurer's agent who informed insured that insurer would deny liability
constituted a "waiver of proof of loss," because the proof of loss was "useless and
unnecessary"); See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Oceano Towing Co., 197 F.2d 210, 211 (Fla. 5th
Cir. 1952) (holding that when defendant, insurer, by its letter of May 14, 1948, originally
denied liability under the policy, it based such denial, not on lack of notice, but upon lack of
coverage, thereby waiving policy notice requirements); See Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co. v. Phelps, 294 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (disallowing certain proof of
loss defenses because court could "not conceive" that insurer denied claim on unrelated
grounds and failed to avail itself of rights under the policy to inspect and supervise repair
pre-suit); See Quesada v. F.E.M.A., 577 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that
letter denying liability waived proof of loss requirements).
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Perhaps the purest Florida "mend the hold" case is found in the
Southern District of Florida's opinion in Yorkshire Ins. Co.8 2 Again,
rather than applying the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, the court applies
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. There, certain insured shipping
containers were lost and suit was brought by the owner of the contain-
ers against the container insurer.8 3 Prior to litigation, the insurer set
forth four specific grounds for the initial denial of coverage.8 4 Once in
litigation, the insurer asserted some other defenses not raised in the
claim denial letter based on technical policy exclusions.8 5
Neither citing the Harbor Ins. Co. decision, nor mentioning the
words "mend the hold," the court applied the Harbor Ins. Co. "Mend
the Hold" doctrine and rejected the new defenses as having been
"waived:"
[I]t is again the Court's conclusion that it was Underwriters' intent
to waive certain defenses that had not been asserted in the denial of
coverage. However, the Court recognizes that without sufficient in-
formation, a defendant cannot be held knowingly to have waived a
particular defense in an initial denial of coverage. In other words, if
an insurer recognizes the applicability of a particular defense based
upon evidence uncovered subsequent to an initial denial of cover-
age, that insurer should not be precluded from using such a defense
on the theory that the defense was waived in the initial denial of
coverage, particularly where there is no evidence to indicate that an
insured relied upon a waiver to its detriment .... Based upon the
evidence represented to the Court, it is clear that Underwriters had
knowledge [of the new defenses]86
Here the essentials of the "mend the hold" are present but are merged
with the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right" element, com-
monly associated with the waiver doctrine, and the "detrimental
reliance" element, commonly associated with estoppel principles.
While lacking all of the elements of either waiver or estoppel, all the
elements of "mend the hold" are present.
B. "Mend the Hold" In Florida Procedure and Statutes
No rule of Florida procedure or provision of the Florida Statutes
specifically mentions the "Mend the Hold" doctrine, just as specific ap-
plication of the doctrine cannot be found in Florida case law. With
82. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
83. Id. at 1347.
84. Id. at 1346-47.
85. Id. at 1342-43.
86. Id. at 1347.
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liberal procedural rules allowing amendment of pleadings, there ap-
pears to be significant tension between the "Mend the Hold" doctrine
and those rules. Upon closer scrutiny, however, both Florida rules of
pleading procedure and the insurance code appear to be entirely com-
patible with the application of "Mend the Hold" doctrine in first-party
insurance cases.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1407 is one such example.
The rule clearly provides that any defenses not initially raised are
"waived."8 8 "The operation of the waiver provision of Rule 1.140(h) is
not limited to defenses and objections specified in the rule .... 89 "All
defenses and objections, whether provided for by that rule or by any of
the other rules or by statute, are waived unless initially
presented .... 90 It is certainly arguable that this rule, read in pari
materia with the rules of procedure, provides for the liberal amend-
ment of pleadings and allows pleadings to be amended to add new
defenses. After reviewing the judicial gloss interpreting the procedural
amendment rule, however, an equally compelling argument can be
made against amendment of the rule, in that the rule, and its judicial
interpretation, appears to codify a quasi-"Mend the Hold" doctrine by
providing for the waiver of defenses not initially raised.
Under the applicable case law, the amendment, while liberal, is
not automatic. If the amendment will be futile, the amendment pro-
cess has been abused, or if the amendment is prejudicial to a party, it
will be disallowed. 91 Judge Posner stated that both abuse of the
amendment process and prejudicial conduct are demonstrated where
"a party ...hokes up a phony defense to the performance of these
duties and then when that defense fails (at some expense to the other
party) tries on another defense for size."92
Under such circumstances, Judge Posner would say that an in-
surer attempting to amend its pleadings is acting in bad faith.93
87. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h). Waiver of Defenses. (1) A party waives all defenses and
objections that the party does not present either by motion .., or, in a responsive pleading.
(2) The defenses of failure to state a cause of action or a legal defense or to join an
indespensable party may be raised.., at the trial on the merits in addition to being raised
either ... in the answer or reply. The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter
may be raised at any time.
88. Id.
89. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h) Committee Comments, Waiver of defenses.
90. Id.
91. See Carr ex. rel Estate of Grushka v. PersonaCare of Pompano E., Inc., 890 So. 2d
288, 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) See also Butler Univ. v. Bahssin, 892 So. 2d 1087,
1089 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
92. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
93. Id.
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Indeed, Florida Insurance Statutes reveal that public policy in Florida
favors a prompt determination by insurers of whether reasonable
grounds exist to deny a claim for coverage. These statutes underscore
Judge Posner's concerns regarding the inequity and bad faith which
often result from an insurer's shifting of defenses. If the claim denial
is delayed, based on insufficient information or an insufficient investi-
gation, or denied without a factual explanation of the reasons for
denial, those circumstances give rise to statutory bad faith under Flor-
ida law. 94 In the no-fault automobile insurance arena, an insurer is
required to deny a claim within 30 days. 95 Thus, both Florida proce-
dure and Florida's Insurance Code contain provisions similar to those
promoted by the "Mend the Hold" doctrine of defense waiver and the
prompt determination of defenses.
Using standard cooperation clauses 96 in policies, insurance
companies require insureds, prior to filing lawsuits, to produce docu-
ments, attend examinations under oath,97 and provide all details
surrounding the loss. The insurer's pre-suit right of investigation,
under the threat of claim denial, is broad and aimed at making sure
that only rightful claims are paid. Full compliance with these policy
provisions is a condition precedent to an action on an insurance
claim.98 Hence, an insurer has the opportunity to fully investigate and
test even the most routine claim prior to issuing its claim denial. Stan-
dard policy cooperation and investigation provisions along with
statutory bad faith provisions, which require that an insurer conduct a
94. See FLA. STAT. § 627.426(2)(a), (b) (1982) (known as the claims' administration
statute which requires a liability insurer to raise coverage defenses within 30 days or waive
those defenses to coverage); see also FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (2005) (incorporating FLA. STAT.
§ 626.9541(i) (2008), requiring insurers to properly investigate and evaluate claims and
creating a cause of action for bad faith if the insurer violates the statute in the claims
process); see also FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(i)(3)(a)-(i) (2008) (requiring an insurer to promptly
and reasonably communicate and investigate claims or be held liable for bad faith).
95. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(3) (2008) (requiring an insurer to investigate and deny a claim
within 30 days or pay the claim).
96. 34 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 155 § 1, R. 15.8 (2008) (A cooperation clause
generally requires the insured's cooperation with the investigation of the insurer.).
97. See Goldman v. State Farm Fire Gen. Ins. Co., 660 So. 2d 300, 303 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an insured who refused to attend examination under oath
forfeited entire policy); see also Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 901 F.2d 944, 945
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that giving of recorded statements and other written statements
with a claims adjuster not the equivalent of an examination under oath); see also Fassi v.
Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 700 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a delayed
willingness to comply with examination under oath provision does not cure initial refusal).
98. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collura, 163 So. 2d 784, 788 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
Because cooperation clauses are material policy conditions, material breaches of such
clauses preclude recovery, unless waiver or estoppel can be shown. See generally 34 AM JUR
POF 2D 155 (2008).
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reasonable investigation, counterbalance any argument that an in-
surer should be allowed to amend to state a defense not initially
presented in the claims denial letter.
There are two questions that should be addressed for purposes
of determining the proper balance between liberal amendment and
strict application of the "Mend the Hold" doctrine in first-party insur-
ance matters. The first question involves an insurer who has not
availed itself of the full pre-suit cooperation of its insured, its contrac-
tual right to investigate, or its statutory obligation to provide an
insured with a factual basis for its claim denial after a reasonable in-
vestigation. Under those circumstances, is the insurer abusing the
amendment process, to the prejudice of the insured, by denying the
claim on one ground and then switching grounds after the insured files
a lawsuit on the claim? Second, can the insured reasonably assert it is
bad faith for the insurer to change its position on the basis of informa-
tion that could not be acquired earlier?99 A simple, appropriate
response is found in Judge Posner's Harbor Ins. Co. opinion: "[Procedu-
ral considerations aside], one might suppose that an insurer owes their
[sic] insured a duty of fuller inquiry prior to denying a claim on a
ground that later proved to be untenable."1 00
Florida's Rules of Procedure when read in conjunction with pro-
visions of Florida's Insurance Code would appear to prohibit
amendment to "add" defenses not raised in the claim denial letter on
par with the "Mend the Hold" doctrine. Given that an insurer has sub-
stantial pre-suit investigation rights and that the insured is required
to cooperate in that investigation, requiring the insurer to explore all
possible defenses, or risk waiving any defenses not raised prior to a
claim being denied, does not appear incompatible with existing rules of
procedure in Florida.
Other Florida rules of procedure recognize the unfairness to one
party when another party actually raises a defense but fails to fully
flesh out a position. These rules are clearly consistent with the concep-
tual underpinnings of the "Mend the Hold" doctrine. For example,
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(b) requires matters of fraud to be
plead with specificity.
The rationale underlying the heightened pleading requirements
for fraud is meant to enable the party charged to respond specifically to
spurious charges of fraudulent behavior by alerting them to the precise
99. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
100. Id.
Vol. 4:1:73
MENDING THE HOLD IN FLORIDA
conduct with which it is charged. 10 1 In a life insurance context, Florida
courts have held that a fraud claim not specifically pleaded is properly
dismissed. 102
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c) requires that a denial of
performance or occurrence of a conditions precedent be pled specifi-
cally. If the denial of performance of a condition precedent is not made
with the requisite specificity, then the issue is waived. 0 3 Condition
precedents not preserved by an insurer in a pleading with the required
particularity are considered waived and are insufficient to create an
issue for trial.10 4 Improper pleadings are appropriately disregarded
and a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate in favor of the affirma-
tive pleader. 10 5 An amendment is not a result contemplated by this
language. For that reason, it can be surmised that Florida's various
rules of procedure follow the "Mend the Hold" doctrine because a plead-
ing must be absolute to proceed in litigation.
The rules of pleading procedure for both fraud and condition
precedents are yet two additional examples of legal recognition of the
fact that, under certain circumstances, allowing a party to amend its
pleadings is inconsistent with basic notions of fairness. In that regard,
the procedural rule's compatibility with the rationale behind the
"Mend the Hold" doctrine is quite apparent.
III. CONCLUSION
Whether the practice is labeled waiver, estoppel, or "mend the
hold," Florida courts recognize that there are situations where permit-
ting an insurer to change its position after an insured files a lawsuit
would lead to injustice. The Courts of Florida have addressed this per-
ceived unfairness by loosely applying equitable doctrines to prohibit an
insurer from raising matters not raised in the initial claim denial let-
ter. These equitable applications would be more clearly defined as the
"Mend the Hold" doctrine, which would serve to avoid judicial confu-
101. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., 116 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 1997).
102. Robertson v. PHF Life Ins. Co., 702 So.2d 555, 556 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
103. Hodusa Corp. v. Abra Constr. Corp., 546 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); W.J. Kiely & Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 145 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Davie Westview Developers, Inc. v. Boblin, 533 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); San Marco Contracting Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 386 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Scarborough Assoc. v. Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 647 So. 2d 1001, 1004
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Paulk v. Peyton, 648 So. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
104. Cooke v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 652 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
105. Paulk, 648 So. 2d 772.
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sion between the distinct doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and "mend the
hold."
Part of the judicial reluctance to label the doctrine as "Mend the
Hold" may stem from a perceived conflict between the doctrine and
procedural rules allowing for liberal amendment of pleadings. Upon
closer scrutiny, Florida procedure, Florida's Insurance Code, accepted
insurance policy provisions, and the "Mend the Hold" doctrine all
seemingly come together to promote the same ends. A reasonable in-
vestigation aided by the insured's full cooperation, followed by a
prompt claims decision, is a result clearly contemplated by Florida's
Insurance Code and accepted policy provisions. Florida Procedure and
the "Mend the Hold" doctrine both limit the right to amend pleadings
in many respects and provides for a waiver of matters not timely or
properly raised.
In the final analysis, a cogent, consistent judicial theory pre-
cluding insurers from raising known or discoverable defenses not
initially raised in the letter of claim denial properly strikes the fairness
balance between all parties in coverage litigation. Formal adoption of
the "Mend the Hold" doctrine would promote fairness and judicial econ-
omy and is more desirable than the present ad hoc approach applied by
Florida courts.
Fairness would dictate that insurers must be advised to fully
avail themselves of their pre-suit rights and their corresponding statu-
tory duty to investigate the basis for claim denial. Further, fairness
would dictate that the insured contemplating litigation against its in-
surer should be able to determine whether the basis for claim denial is
legitimate or not before incurring the substantial emotional and mone-
tary costs associated with prolonged coverage dispute. In the event of
coverage litigation, judicial economy is enhanced by narrowing the liti-
gation issues and by transferring much of the discovery process to the
pre-suit claims process, where the insured is required to cooperate and
the insurer is required to reasonably investigate.
By whatever name and in whatever form, whether substantive
estoppel, procedural specificity, bad faith or automobile no-fault law,
Florida jurisprudence has got a good grip on the idea that an insurer
owes its insured a full inquiry prior to denying a claim. Now, all that
needs to be done is to stop wrestling with the doctrine's designation.
Following Vermont's lead and renaming the doctrine the "insurance
defense waiver rule"10 6 would help clarify some of the mystification
106. See Sitkoff, supra note 5 (noting that Vermont, which has advanced the "Mend the
Hold" doctrine, has renamed the doctrine as the "Insurance Defense Waiver Rule").
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surrounding the "Mend the Hold" doctrine. As legally curious 0 7 or as
"quirky" 08 as the phrase, "mend the hold," may sound, the doctrine is
a reality for insureds and insurers, alike. Florida courts would be well
served to properly recognize and apply the doctrine with judicial
authority.10 9
107. Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
108. Id.
109. Id.

